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Introduction
With the growing popularity of Information and CommunicationTechnologies (ICTs), new communication media such as the In-ternet, mobile phones, and social media are penetrating people’s
everyday lives and transforming the way they express themselves, interact
with each other, articulate daily experience, and perceive the world. Beyond
being merely a matter of technology, new media have become embedded
in politics, the economy, culture, and social systems and are further shaping
them. (1) Among them, collective memory, (2) an indicator of social and po-
litical change, (3) is one of reconfigurations under the influence of new media.
As several studies demonstrate, the bottom-up, peer-to-peer, and horizontal
communication enabled by low-end, easy-to-use, and networked commu-
nication technologies not only facilitates a continuous and accumulating
memory, but also provides new opportunities for citizens to scrutinise and
interrogate previous material archives as static memories, thus influencing
how the past is remembered. (4)
This study takes weibo, China’s microblogging services, as a case to in-
vestigate the impact of social media on the (re)formation of collective
memory in contemporary China. China has the world’s most active social
media users. (5) Ninety-five percent of Internet users in major cities are reg-
ular users of social media. (6) Weibo is one of the most widely used social
media in China. (7) More than 290 million weibo users accounted for 45.9%
of the total 632 million Chinese Internet users in 2014. (8) As an interactive
and dynamic platform, weibo sees diversified voices and discourses from
users from different backgrounds and social strata. (9) In particular, Chinese
people’s reliance on weibo as a platform for airing opinions, exposing dis-
content, criticising government policies, or venting anger over specific in-
cidents is intensifying as the tightening of state control over mass media
persists. (10) Studies on weibo as a means of civic engagement and deliber-
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ation (11) and of mobilisation of political contention (12) have consequently
flourished. Nevertheless, a relatively large amount of research so far fo-
cuses exclusively on the analysis of contemporary, discrete online con-
tentious events, (13) without scrutinising the political influence of weibo on
a larger living context – among others, a society’s collective memory – be-
yond a simple realisation of overt contentious possibility.
This study aims to fill this gap by exploring the influence of weibo on col-
lective memory. More specifically, we ask: how does weibo provide a plat-
form to articulate people’s previous experiences and memories and further
(re)shape collective memory in contemporary China? We first provide a
critical review of current studies on collective memory and media, address-
ing the relevance of approaching such a topic from the perspective of social
media – weibo in this study. Second, we briefly elaborate on methodological
issues, followed by an overview of the selected case: the debate over “The
Three-Year Great Chinese Famine” (hereafter “the Great Famine”) on weibo.
Given the fact that “the Great Famine” remains politically taboo (14) and that
there are complicated mechanisms of censorship on weibo to eliminate or
restrict discussion of politically taboo topics, (15) it is a bit surprising to us
that weibo services have not completely blocked or censored tweets con-
taining keywords such as “the Great Famine.” In other words, one can still
search for and read tweets containing “the Great Famine.” We do not know
the reason for this, however. (16) Third, we scrutinise how weibo provides an
opportunity for ordinary people to articulate and disseminate their alter-
native narratives of memories that previously had never been publicly ac-
knowledged, in particular those that had been marginalised, excluded, or
subjected to “forced amnesia” by the authorities. We argue that the artic-
ulation, accumulation, and dissemination of experiences and memories on
weibo engender counter- and alternative narratives that contest the official
framework of memory, reshape collective memory of the famine, and
thereby generate a long-term influence on society. We conclude with
thoughts on the political influence and implications of weibo on the recon-
struction of collective memory in contemporary China.
New media and collective memory: A
research agenda
As the first scholar to use the term “collective memory,” French philoso-
pher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs developed the foundational frame-
work for the study of societal remembrance. (17) Collective memory
represents society’s understanding of its past, defines the relationships be-
tween the individual and society, and allows the community to preserve its
self-image and to transfer it through time. However, as Halbwachs observes,
“Collective memory must be distinguished from history.” (18) Instead, it is
“essentially a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present.” (19) Halb-
wachs’s works explore how the present situation affects the selective per-
ception of history. (20) In his work On Collective Memory (Les cadres sociaux
de la mémoire), Halbwachs differentiates collective memory from “social
frameworks for memory,” emphasising that “it is to the degree that our in-
dividual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this
memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.” (21) Halbwachs claims
that, as a socially constructed notion, individual memory is constructed
within social structures and institutions. More specifically, individuals or-
ganise and understand events and concepts within a social context. They
then remember them in a way that “rationally” orders and organises them
through that same social construction, or “social framework for memory.” (22)
Later scholars advanced Halbwachs’s work in various ways to elucidate the
relations between social context and (re)construction of collective memory.
Among them, Nora expands upon Halbwachs’s discussion by recognising
that groups select certain dates and people to commemorate, deliberately
eliminate others from representation, and invent traditions and norms to
preserve and support a specific collective memory. (23) Nora observed that
the representations of collective memory are those that have been specifi-
cally selected by people in power. In this sense, collective memory becomes
both a tool and an object of power. Like Halbwachs, Nora suggests that the
“collective memory” of any group is a manipulated construction by those
who maintain the power and status to define those memories.
Although political power exerts considerable influences on the framing of
collective memory, as Steiner and Zelizer point out, collective memory is a
process that is constantly unfolding, changing, and transforming. Neither
linear nor logical, the process of shaping collective memory is instead “dy-
namic and unexpected.” (24) Social, political, and cultural factors engage in
the negotiation of collective memory in which different stories and narra-
tives compete for a place in the reconstruction of the past. (25)
Among many factors, media, in particular new media, play an emerging
role in the process of shaping and formatting collective memory. (26) The
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availability and accessibility of new communication devices not only enable
but also encourage alternative and counter narratives to emerge and pro-
liferate against more official versions of history. (27) Social media, given its
technological affordances of openness, accessibility, and interactivity, to
mention just a few, emerge as a relevant channel for articulating, sharing,
and disseminating narratives of the past. Nevertheless, very few studies so
far have investigated the role of social media in (re)shaping social memory,
leaving the field virtually unexplored. Similarly, in the case of China, existing
studies keep their focus on weblogs, (28) devoting less attention to the emerg-
ing role of weibo in (re-)shaping collective memory.
To fill this gap, this study explores the role of weibo for articulating people’s
memories and further (re)shaping collective memory in contemporary China.
We take the debate over “the Great Famine” on weibo platforms to investigate:
RQ1: What kinds of counter- and alternative narratives of the past
have been articulated and circulated through weibo?
RQ2: How are these narratives on weibo different from the official
narrative, or the dominant social framework for memory of this spe-
cific period of the past? 
RQ3: How and to what extent do the narratives of the past on weibo
challenge or change collective memory in China?
To study the use of weibo and how weibo articulates people’s memories
and further (re)shapes collective memory through these uses, we present
data collected through participant observation (29) and immersion in the de-
bate over “the Great Famine” on Sina Weibo, the most popular social media
platform in China. This methodology can be described as ethnography in
virtual worlds. (30) More specifically, we “immersed” ourselves in this case by
observing the start of the debate, monitoring it throughout the whole
process (29 April to 2 May 2012), taking field notes about how people in-
teracted and discussed this issue with each other, and recording – some-
times taking screenshots of – tweets in the debate hour by hour. (31) We also
“participated” in the discussion by marking the original and relevant tweets
(e.g., those by weibo celebrities) as “favourite” and following the hashtag
“#the Great Famine” (#dajihuang, #大饥荒) on weibo in order to receive
and retrieve the latest tweets under the hashtag even after the debate. Nev-
ertheless, we did not engage in the discussion in order to leave the ongoing
debate undisturbed and to avoid incorporating ourselves into the debate.
Instead, we acted as a “lurker” to take participant observation and docu-
ment the discussion. We also collected information from publications and
media reports about “the Great Famine” as objects of analysis. 
We then conducted analysis of data from weibo and traditional media.
To work with participant observation data from weibo, specifically, we fol-
lowed the guidelines of Boellstorff, Nardi, Pearce, and Taylor, (32) read the
tweets, looked for core themes, categorised them, and highlighted key
phrases and statements to identify explanations that illuminate the re-
search question and develop new insights. We also integrated our field
notes into the analysis. In short, the debate on weibo demonstrates a dis-
tinct disarticulation between individual narratives and the authorities’
narratives of the past. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that the case
of the debate over “the Great Famine” is not intended as a representative
sampling of political activities on weibo. Instead, the case highlights issues
of special relevance for an understanding of the long-term influence of
weibo on Chinese society beyond a simple realisation of overt contentious
possibility.
The debate over “the three-year Great
Chinese Famine” on weibo
The debate over “the Great Famine” on weibo platforms was triggered by Lin
Zhibo, head of the Gansu Province branch of People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao),
the mouthpiece newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Having a
verified account of his affiliation and more than 230,000 weibo followers, Lin
questioned the multi-million death toll between 1960 and 1962 on his weibo
account on 29 April 2012, asserting that the number was a conspiracy “to
defile Chairman Mao by utilising the exaggerated slander of tens of millions
of people dying of starvation.” (33) According to Lin’s tweet, “… locals only heard
that people had died of starvation, but they had not personally witnessed any
deaths from famine…very few people can be directly confirmed to have
starved to death [in that era].” The claim that “millions died of starvation” was
therefore fabricated to defame the leadership of Chairman Mao.
Lin’s tweet quickly ignited outrage in the weibo community. Strong criti-
cism was directed towards his denial of the starvation and deaths of millions
in the early 1960s. The post was retweeted more than 7,000 times within
four hours after it was first published, with the original post receiving more
than 5,000 comments, most of which were scorching critiques. Lin had to
shut down the reply function for this tweet. (34) Trying to defend his view-
point and to argue against weibo users who poured out their wrath and
criticism towards his tweet, Lin responded with a string of somehow
provocative questions, such as “…for those who heaped curses on me, tell
me the person that died of starvation in your family during that period”
[17:23, 29 April 2012], and “…so far none of you [who either retweeted my
tweet or commented on it] have told me who starved to death in your fam-
ilies, yet all of you are declaring that there were millions of deaths [in that
era]... If it were true, wouldn’t that mean hundreds of millions dead?...”
[17:40, 29 April 2012].
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Probably to Lin’s surprise, numerous weibo users did respond to his ques-
tions with various materials that demonstrated millions of deaths occurring
in the early 1960s due to the famine. These materials included, among oth-
ers, CCP archives and documents, government statistics, academic works,
news reports, documentary films, and memoirs, stories, and memories about
that period from their families.
Following such moves, Lin apologised on 30 April and 1 May, admitting
that “…the population in 1960 shrank by 10 million as a result of the grave
errors of the Great Leap Forward (35) and the People’s Commune Move-
ment, (36) according to the conclusion given in ‘The Seventy Year History of
the Communist Party of China’ (1991.8, first edition, p. 329)” (37) [20:40, 30
April 2012]. He also deleted the tweet that denied the famine mortality
and replaced it with a more general apology (38) that attributed his misguided
remarks to a lack of awareness of that period. Lin’s apology has been
retweeted more than 23,000 times and has been commented on more than
17,000 times. Although Lin’s apology overturned his denial of the deaths of
the famine, the debate over “the Great Famine” continued. For one thing,
Lin’s apology kept drawing more criticism from weibo users, who questioned
how someone like Lin, who majored in history as an undergraduate and who
pursued further studies in Party and military history afterward, could be so
ignorant of that era. (39) For another, various activities related to the explo-
ration of “the Great Famine” were being carried out not only on weibo but
also in traditional media such as Southern People Weekly (Nanfang Renwu
Zhoukan). Meanwhile, the controversy surrounding Lin never really subsided,
either. One of the latest examples occurred in July 2014, when Lanzhou
University in northwest China appointed Lin Zhibo dean of its journalism
school. The decision sparked fierce discussions on weibo, where users im-
mediately recalled the debate and subsequent criticism of Lin, centring on
his denial of the existence of the Great Famine and the deaths in that part
of Chinese history. (40)
Findings
During the debate over “the Great Famine,” weibo provided a platform for
ordinary people to engage in the collective remembering process, in which
the articulation, dissemination, and aggregation of counter- and alternative
historical narratives and memories emerged and proliferated, arguing
against the official and orthodox version of the events from 1959 to 1961
in China. The intertwining of online and offline participation by people with
and, more importantly, without weibo accounts revealed abundant histor-
ical material that was previously either unavailable to the public or banned
from publication in the Chinese mainland due to the censorship. Many pre-
viously unknown individual memories and experiences about those three
years finally came to light as the debate evolved.
The dissemination and aggregation of counter- and
alternative historical narratives
When talking about the historical period of the People’s Republic of China
from 1958 to 1961, Chinese people often use the term “the Three Years of
Economic Difficulty” (sannian jingji kunnan) or “the Three-year Natural Dis-
aster” (sannian ziran zhaihai). This is largely due to the following two rea-
sons: first, the description and conclusion in official discourse; and second,
very limited information on the history of this period has been made avail-
able to the public. More specifically, people access information about this
period through two channels: one is the historical textbook for compulsory
courses in high school, which describes this period as “the Three Years of
Economic Difficulty.” (41) Never mentioning the death toll, this narrative at-
tributes the fact of millions of people being wiped out by starvation to a
series of natural disasters, such as drought and poor weather during that
period. The textbook also talks about the Soviet Union’s “perfidious” with-
drawal of experts and technicians from China and its demands for payments
for its industrial hardware, saying this exacerbated an already difficult situ-
ation and accelerated population loss. (42) The other narrative is from History
of the Chinese Communist Party, the official chronicle of the CCP, which
claims “…serious natural disasters [in 1959] led to a decrease of over 30
million tons in food production…According to official statistics, the total
national population in 1960 shrank 10 million from the preceding year”
(emphasis added). (43) To sum up, official and orthodox discourse about the
historical period between 1959 and 1961 underlines unavoidable natural
disasters and an external factor (the Soviet Union’s withdrawal) as the only
two reasons leading to the famine deaths. Meanwhile, the narratives remain
very vague without mentioning any details about the famine. Also, the Chi-
nese mass media have rarely touched on this topic due to its political sen-
sitivity. (44) These vague and unclear narratives make people refer to the
historical period from 1959 to 1961 as a political taboo, (45) or a “dark chap-
ter” (46) in the history of the CCP, which is strictly under the Party’s control. 
In this sense, the debate over “the Great Famine” on weibo for the first time
allowed the articulation and proliferation of counter- and alternative historical
narratives about the historical period from 1959 to 1961. Criticism of the of-
ficial, orthodox narrative consequently emerged and has been disseminated
to a wide extent. Generally speaking, weibo users engaged in the debate by
contributing counter- and alternative historical narratives from two aspects.
First is the authenticity of the famine. Lin’s tweets called into question the
very existence of the famine between 1959 and 1961. To respond to his doubt,
weibo users, be they celebrities or ordinary people, engaged in articulating
44 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 5 / 1
35. The Great Leap Forward took place in 1958 as Mao’s attempt to modernise China’s economy. For
more information, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (Vol. 3), Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, “The Great Leap Forward,
the People’s Commune and the Sino-Soviet Split,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No.72,
2011, pp. 861-880.
36. The People’s Commune movement tried to transform China quickly from a socialist system to a
communist system; see Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, “The Great Leap Forward, the People’s Com-
mune and the Sino-Soviet Split,” op. cit.
37. This work offers the official history of the Chinese Communist Party.
38. Lin’s tweet read, “I haven’t done much research about the history of the Great Famine and didn’t
know much of it. In the past few days, I received a lot of messages from internet users describing
their traumas at the time. I’m deeply shocked at what I’ve learned. My inappropriate words have
triggered many people’s painful memories and hurt many people’s feelings. I feel very sorry and
hereby apologise to everybody! Thanks to netizens for pointing out my mistakes. I hope we can
work together to prevent such a tragedy from happening again.” [10:14, 1 May 2012]
39. See, for instance,www.weibo.com/1956025337/ygWvJDdMX (accessed on 15 August 2014).
40. See, for instance, www.weibo.com/1802485367/Bd5Itaofc (accessed on 15 August 2014).
41. History Section of People’s Education Press, A Modern and Contemporary History of China (Vol-
ume II), Beijing, People’s Education Press, 2003, p. 109.
42. History Section of People’s Education Press, A Modern and Contemporary History of China, op.
cit., pp. 109-110.
43. The Central Party History Research Office, History of the Chinese Communist Party (Volume II,
1949-1978), Beijing, Party History Press, 2011, pp. 368-369.
44. Although a few articles from, for instance, Yanhuang Chunqiu, a liberal-leaning monthly journal,
covered this topic before the debate, the articles were still circulating within a very small circle
and few people knew of them.
45. Tania Branigan, “China’s Great Famine: The true story,” 1 January 2013, www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jan/01/china-great-famine-book-tombstone (accessed on 26 September 2014).
46. Junhua Zhang, “China’s Social Memory in a Digitalized World: Assessing the country’s narratives
in blogs,” art. cit., p. 284.
Article
and aggregating alternative stories, memoirs, and memories either from their
own experiences or from those of family members. For instance,
@Lu Gongmin (weibo nickname): Between 1958 and 1960, my great-
grandmother, seven people in my grandparents’ generation, and my
aunt and my uncle, a total of ten people, starved to death one by
one in Tongwei County, Gansu Province. [10:09, 1 May 2012]
@Coding worker Zhao Ye (weibo nickname, verified as a journalist):
Just ended a call with my father, who mentioned that during the
great famine period in the 1960s…there were more than 100 people
who died in our village…in Caohu Village, Anhui Province…@Lin
Zhibo If Director Lin is interested, I can bring you to my hometown
and carry out some interviews. People aged 60 years old or older
there all have similar memories [of the great famine] during that pe-
riod… [23:23, 1 May 2012]
People also circulated similar stories they read from different sources to
prove the existence of “the Great Famine.” For instance, quite a few weibo
posts cited stories from Tombstone: An Account of Chinese Famine in the
1960s (hereafter Tombstone), (47) a government-banned reportage by Yang
Jisheng, a retired journalist of the government-run Xinhua News Agency.
For instance,
@HuoshanBaiyang (weibo nickname, verified as a journalist from the
Xinhua News Agency): I was born in the mid-1970s…so I did not
have any experience with the famine deaths in the 1960s. But my
elders told me quite a few stories, and I also read Yang Jisheng’s
Tombstone. I believed what they said… [30 April 2012, 4:52]
Uncovering a series of colossal tragedies, including cases of cannibalism,
and the continued systematic efforts of the party-state to cover up the his-
tory of the Great Famine, Tombstone has been banned in the Chinese main-
land. Nevertheless, its influence has snowballed in the debate over “the
Great Famine” on weibo.
Alternative historical narratives also came from memoirs by Party cadres.
For instance, @QinglouZhishang (weibo nickname) quoted the memoir of
veteran cadre Li Lei, then secretary of the Party committee of Linxia Pre-
fecture, Gansu Province, in which Li revealed that “…588 people ate 337
bodies in 10 communes in Linxia City” during “the Great Famine.” (48)
In addition to publishing these materials on their own weibo accounts,
people also tweeted them to weibo celebrities with several millions of fol-
lowers, such as Yu Jianrong (a professor at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences with 1.8 million weibo followers) and Kai-Fu Lee (a Taiwanese IT
entrepreneur with more than 51 million weibo followers), for further dis-
semination of these stories, memoirs, or statistics to a wider readership on
the basis of their influence.
Second is the death toll during the famine. Again, weibo users collected
various materials to argue against Lin’s denial of the death toll. For instance,
with more than 2 million weibo followers, economist Mao Yushi proposed
his method of calculating the death toll and estimated a total of 36 million
[19:56, 30 April 2012]. Historical scholar Lei Yi, who has more than 270,000
followers, presented demographer Cao Shuji’s article “The Great Famine: A
demographic analysis of population in China between 1959 to 1961” and
Dutch historian Frank Dikötter’s book Mao’s Great Famine: The History of
China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62, which declare death tolls
of 32.5 million and 45 million, respectively [9:19, 1 May 2012]. Writer Chen
Lan also quoted statistics from two authoritative sources, The Cambridge
History of China and History of the Chinese Communist Party, showing that
the death toll would be either 37 million or 10 million.
In addition to “weibo celebrities,” ordinary weibo users also offered sta-
tistics they read from academic and historical documents to back up their
opinions about the death toll. Xiyue Jianglang (weibo nickname), for in-
stance, presented figures raised by American Sinologist Basil Ashton and
Ansley J. Coale, former chair of the Population Association of America, a
professional organisation devoted to population-related issues. According
to his tweet, Ashton estimated that there were around “…30 million excess
deaths and about 33 million lost or postponed births,” while Coale believed
the death toll was 27 million.
In short, alternative narratives and statistics about “the Great Famine”
proliferated within only two days on weibo. These narratives or numbers
from various sources not only argued against Lin’s denial but also demon-
strated a fundamentally different narrative of the historical period from that
provided by the dominant official discourse and the prescribed social frame-
work of memory. Be they celebrities with thousands of weibo followers or
ordinary users, people worked together to articulate, disseminate, and for-
ward these narratives, stories, memoirs, and statistics to a wider scope. Such
sharing and distribution not only greatly shaped the online debate over the
historical period but also gradually established the concept of “the Great
Famine,” which consequently replaced the term “the Three Years of Eco-
nomic Difficulty” or “the Three-year Natural Disaster” in the discussion.
The availability of previously inaccessible documents
Weibo allows users to post and distribute information in various forms,
such as text, photos, music, short videos, or a combination of multimedia
content. Long-form content and links from other websites can also be em-
bedded in a tweet. Posts on weibo therefore become content-rich, descrip-
tive, and vivid. The technological affordances (49) of weibo enabled
participants in the debate to present an abundance of historical material
covering the period from 1959 to 1961 by crowdsourcing. In particular,
many historical archives and documentaries that were previously unavail-
able to the public, such as Party documents and archives, (50) books that had
been censored by the government, and overseas documentaries, accumu-
lated on weibo and were exposed to the public for the first time to confirm
the very existence of the famine.
Before the debate, few people had heard of Frank Dikötter’s work (51) on
the famine. After historian Lei Yi posted a photo of the cover of the tradi-
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tional Chinese translation of Dikötter’s work published in Hong Kong, quite
a few people followed him on weibo and asked where they could find this
book. As soon as one of them replied that s/he had an electronic version of
this book, a lot of people sent their email addresses, asking for a copy of it.
Similarly, weibo encouraged the dissemination of Yang’s Tombstone, which
was banned from publication in the mainland, allowing more people to read
and share the tragedies of the famine.
On 1 May 2012, Charles Xue Biqun, a Chinese-American entrepreneur
known by his weibo nickname “Xue Manzi” with more than 11 million fol-
lowers, posted long-form content (as a picture) that compiled detailed dis-
cussion about “the Great Famine.” The collection also included posts that
had been deleted by Sina Weibo due to their political sensitivity. In this post,
Xue (52) encouraged people to take time to read this collection carefully, as
“…tens of millions of people starved to death between 1959 and 1961.”
[10:18, 1 May 2012]
Given the unprecedented abundance of historical materials and archives
generated by weibo users during and after the debate, Chinese writer Zhang
Lifan established an online monument dedicated to the memory of the
Great Famine. (53)
The intertwining of online and offline participation
Engagement in the debate over “the Great Famine” existed not only on
the weibo platform, but also extended offline and then went back online.
Specifically, weibo users moved offline to collect material about the famine
and then shared these materials on weibo. In particular, this process features
a specific intertwining of online and offline participation by people with
and without weibo accounts – or even without Internet access.
Previous studies have already recognised that new communication tech-
nologies, including the Internet, mobile phones, and social media, allow peo-
ple to participate in political debates or contentious activities both online
and offline. (54) In most current studies, participants are more or less corre-
lated to contentious issues and engage in contention by utilising and ma-
noeuvring ICT resources available to them. For instance, participants in
ICT-mediated contention would be residents who utilise the Internet and
mobile phones to argue against potentially detrimental petrochemical proj-
ects, (55) or individuals or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who
employed online forums to expose corruption or injustice that violates their
interests. (56) The participants in the debate over “the Great Famine” are
rather different. Because most weibo users were born in the 1970s or 1980s,
they have no direct experience with the famine in the 1960s, but could only
gain knowledge of that period from textbooks. Nevertheless, during the de-
bate they “went back” to the offline world, collected stories and memories
from people they knew who suffered during the famine (most of them
delved into their grandparents’ past), and re-told their stories and memories
via weibo. It is in this sense that people who experienced and survived the
famine, even if they did not have weibo accounts or Internet access, were
still able to participate in the debate, no matter how indirectly. Their stories
and memories, previously largely unknown to the public, thereby became
relevant evidence of the famine and became known to more people. For in-
stance:
@Z Chunlei (weibo nickname): I was born in the 1980s, so I have no
experience of the famine. However, my mother, who was born in the
1950s, often told me stories of starvation during that period [from
1959 to 1961]… The most impressive one is that a beggar asked my
grandma for something to eat, which my grandma refused. The beg-
gar kept on walking for less than 500 meters and then died at the
entrance of the village.
@ BeiDafei (weibo nickname): My parents’ hometown is located in
the northern part of Suzhou City. I called them and asked whether
there were people who died of hunger during the Great Famine. My
father said that one hungry cousin came to visit his neighbour for
something to eat. However, the neighbour did not have extra food
to give him. After a few days, the cousin died of hunger. My mother
said that quite a few children ate too much potherb and were poi-
soned to death, including a young daughter of her high school head-
master....
A lot of similar examples show that it was not only weibo users who joined
the debate, but also their relatives and friends who experienced “the Great
Famine” period but whose experiences, stories, and memories were un-
known to others because they lacked weibo accounts or Internet access. In
this way, the articulation of alternative narratives represents not only the
experiences of weibo users, but more importantly, the experiences of people
who lived through the period of 1959-1961 but never had the opportunity
to tell their experiences and memories. These marginalised and suppressed
experiences and memories have been disseminated for the first time
through weibo, making them relevant to the social memory of the period
of 1959-1961.
Moreover, the debate over “the Great Famine” moved from the online plat-
form to offline media. Following the debate on the weibo platform, Southern
People Weekly (Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan) devoted a special issue on 21 May
2012 to the topic “The Great Famine,” a term that had never been used in
the mass media to describe the period from 1959 to 1961. The issue included
18 pages of in-depth coverage, showing for the first time black-and-white
photographs of sobbing, famished victims and of farmers gathering leaves
and tree bark for food. More news reports about the famine emerged in mass
media, revealing more stories and memories about this period. (57)
To sum up, the debate over “the Great Famine” on weibo characterises a
specific type of engagement: people with and without weibo accounts
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“worked together” to crowdsource and contribute to the debate. The ma-
jority of people with access to weibo are too young to have any direct ex-
perience or memory of the famine, while those who experienced and
survived the famine never had a chance to share their experiences and
memories with other people or make them known to society. The collabo-
ration between these two groups provided original and valuable accounts
and memories of that period and accordingly deepened the debate over
“the Great Famine.” Without people with access to weibo, stories or mem-
ories of the famine may not have reached a wide audience. Similarly, with-
out people sharing their individual experiences, memories, and stories about
the famine, the debate would have lacked significant evidence. These per-
sonal experiences served as convincing evidence to prove to Lin that there
were indeed deaths during the period of 1959-1961, as well as forming a
shared memory that people felt an urge to let out. The intertwining of online
and offline participation not only expanded the scale, scope, and depth of
the debate, but also integrated fragmented and marginalised memories and
experiences of the famine.
Discussion
In the debate over “the Great Famine,” weibo functions as a relevant
sphere that facilitates investigations of a history that was excluded, mar-
ginalised, or “forced to be forgotten” in China, generating reflections on the
government’s memory policy, articulating individuals’ fragmented memories
of the past and making them relevant to the society, and reshaping collec-
tive memory of the period from 1959 to 1961.
First, beyond verifying the existence of famine deaths and exact numbers,
the debate further probes more politically sensitive questions such as the
cause of the famine and the authenticity of its history. Although initially
the debate focused on verifying the famine and its death toll, the discussion
ventured beyond these two questions. Further questions emerged, such as,
“How shall we evaluate the history of the famine and memorialise it fairly?”,
and more politically sensitive ones such as, “What was the actual cause of
the famine?” For instance, people quoted Dutch historian Dikötter’s work,
which describes “the Great Famine” as “the worst catastrophe in China’s
history, and one of the worst anywhere.” Beyond simply documenting sto-
ries about the famine, Yang’s work Tombstone castigated the political sys-
tem in China that caused millions of deaths within three years.
Distinguished from the official narrative that  blames either nature or the
Soviet Union for the massive number of starvation victims, Yang underlines
“the famine” as an “unnatural disaster.” According to the investigation in
Tombstone, the famine was caused neither by bad weather nor by the So-
viet Union’s treachery, but rather was a “man-made,” political calamity
“born [out] of the system of totalitarianism.” (58) As such, alternative narra-
tives of the famine, in particular those previously banned by the government
and strongly critical of the political system under Mao’s regime, proliferate
via weibo, calling for people to reflect on totalitarian systems. Southern
People Weekly, for instance, noted that “…we should never return to that
political system [from 1959 to 1961].” These critiques and reflections not
only shape people’s perception and knowledge about the historical period
of the famine, but also encourage them to rethink the current political sys-
tem in China.
Meanwhile, the debate scrutinises and reflects upon China’s memory policy
by criticising and challenging the dominant social framework of memory re-
garding the period of 1959-1961. Accordingly, it calls for the government to
face up to and respect the “dark chapters” of history, even if they belong to
the most tragic period. The prescribed social framework of memory deliber-
ately chooses to understate or even make no mention of famine deaths dur-
ing the period of 1959-1961. It also places the blame squarely on either
natural disaster or the Soviet Union. This framework largely shaped social
memory of the period of 1959-1961, with the result that people either have
never heard of “the Great Famine” or attribute it to inexorable reasons such
as the weather. (59) During the debate, people raised questions such as why
the government prevented its people from knowing of the existence of the
Great Famine and why the government has never wanted to face up to this
disastrous historical incident. The outpouring of anger, distrust, and frustration
on weibo towards the government’s highly-controlled memory policy that
aims to eliminate or rewrite dark chapters in the history of the CCP demon-
strates a crisis of legitimacy regarding the dominance of the CCP’s framework
of memory. In its investigation, Southern People Weekly made a provocative
statement, saying that “history [in China] is sometimes divided into two parts:
history itself, and ‘admitted history,’...The famine, which is unparalleled in
human history, has neither an official record nor a reasonable explanation.”
The discussion in Southern People Weekly accordingly suggested that the
government should “face up to history” and openly admit policy errors such
as the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of the People’s Communes.
Most importantly, as the discussion highlights, the government should respect
and memorialise the famine deaths rather than deliberately force society to
forget them. The engagement of traditional media not only expands the in-
fluence of the debate on weibo by continuing investigation on the famine,
but to a degree legitimates the use of the term “the Great Famine” in practice.
In this sense, the debate over “the Great Famine” brings an opportunity to
discuss politically sensitive topics and raise alternative discourse on social
media platforms, which may have a long-term effect on government control
over memory policy and the discussion of historical events.
Second, weibo provides a platform for Chinese people to articulate and
share their individual memories that have never been accessible to the pub-
lic or that have been marginalised, suppressed, or “forced to be forgotten”
by the authority in its framework of memory. The dissemination and accu-
mulation of these fragmented, individual memories on weibo have solidified
into an alternative collective memory that argues against the official frame-
work that deliberately “forgot” it. As we discussed earlier, the official narra-
tive of the historical period in high school textbooks and Party historical
archives never included details about the famine but just a few vague sen-
tences. The debate on weibo, on the other hand, exemplifies detailed indi-
vidual experiences and memories of this period and disseminates them to
an unprecedented extent. These narratives of memories crystallise the his-
tory of the famine, introducing concrete human beings and their suffering
into the vague official statements. As Halbwachs observes, “While the col-
lective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent
body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember” (em-
phasis added). (60) For individuals who survived the famine and for those who
died of starvation, their experiences, including suffering and loss, that had
never been mentioned by the authorities, have been recognised, communi-
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cated, and acknowledged by an increasing number of people. In this process,
weibo users trace back into history and search for the names of each and
every person who starved to death in order to remember them. Likewise, in
this process of gathering evidence to authenticate the famine, individual
experiences, especially in remote rural areas, have been collected, aggre-
gated, and treated with respect.
All of this contributes to the process of recognition and reconstruction of
collective memory of the famine. For instance, Lin admitted in his account
that the collective effort of weibo users caused him to learn a lot about the
devastating stories of the famine. (61) An online survey was initiated after the
debate to determine whether people believed in the 30 million death toll
for the Great Famine period. By the time the survey ended on 10 May, more
than 12,000 weibo users had participated in it and more than 5,000 users
retweeted the result. Among them, 32.1% believed there were more than
30 million deaths, or even 50 or 80 million, over those three years; 36.1%
“firmly believed” that the death toll was 30 million; 24.5% thought the num-
ber was unreliable, and about 7.2% found it difficult to make a judgment. In
other words, seven out of ten participants believed the conclusion that 30
million people – or even more – starved to death over those three years. The
term “the Great Famine” is gradually replacing those used by the authorities
to underline that this is period of history that should not be forgotten.
To sum up, in the debate over “the Great Famine,” weibo functions as a
sphere that, for one thing, invites its users to engage in deliberative discus-
sions and investigations by crowdsourcing materials about the famine. For
another, the weibo sphere generates, articulates, and integrates fragmented
and disjointed individual memories and experiences into a shared, collective
memory of the famine on one of the largest social media platforms in China,
making it relevant to the majority of people in society. The ability of weibo
to empower people to deliver and share their memories and experiences in
a coherent manner underlies its power to generalise and unify collective
memory and further organise the needs of the majority into politically rel-
evant forms of consciousness and activity.
Conclusion
This paper provides one of the first studies on the role of social media in
articulating individual memories and (re-)shaping collective memory in con-
temporary China. It investigates how weibo enables ordinary people to par-
ticipate in distributing, interacting, and accumulating alternative narratives
and memories of the past against the authoritarian version by engaging in
debate over China’s Great Famine – a topic long considered politically taboo
– on Sina Weibo, one of the country’s most popular social media sites, as a
case study. As this study argues, weibo allows people to engage in active,
professed activities to deliberately resist some form of perceived hegemony
by the dominant discourse on history. This study demonstrates that weibo
provides people with an alternative communicative sphere for sharing pre-
viously suppressed, marginalised, and “unofficial” memories as civil disobe-
dience and accumulating them into an alternative collective memory that
is relevant to the changing socio-political context of China.
Looking beyond exceptional moments for long-term
influence
Quite a few studies have identified the political role of new communica-
tion technologies, including the Internet, mobile phones, and social media
such as weibo, in facilitating political activism in a sort of remarkable mo-
ment. Compared with these remarkable moments and cases, the debate
over “the Great Famine” on weibo did not last for a long period. Although
the debate was triggered by a contemporary event, it still generated long-
term political influence. Such long-term influence, we would argue, is largely
based on the mundane use of social media, or what Bakardjieva refers to as
“subactivism” (62) that has been incorporated into and reflected at the level
of everyday use of new media. Even if such debate may not change, for in-
stance, the content of high school textbooks or Party discourse on the Great
Famine, it not only reveals the cumulative effects of ICTs and their “gradual
revolution,” (63) but also sheds light on the deeper impact of new commu-
nication technologies on social and political change in Chinese society
today and in the years to come. It is in this sense that, using the debate
over “the Great Famine” as a case study, we argue that Chinese people en-
gage in a “long revolution” (64) through mundane media in everyday life for
political change, no matter how small. In this sense, this study concludes
that social media’s democratising potential is not just in enabling and fa-
cilitating specific use in contentious moments, but more importantly em-
bedded in routine use that articulates users’ experiences and memories and
further cultivates their political subjectivity. The study contributes to a com-
prehensive understanding of the democratising potential of social media
beyond a simple realisation of contentious possibility, in particular how so-
cial media have been incorporated into the fabric of experience, nurturing
resistance and disobedience, and facilitating an alternative public sphere.
We also suggest more studies addressing the political dynamics embedded
in the articulation and accumulation of experiences and memories by new
media use and its long-term impact on politics, culture, and society.
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